However, I think the differences between Hoffmeyer's and Barbieri's views can become obscured when we look primarily at details of individual signs and sign systems. Peirce's semiotics, however, allows for systems of signs in which one sign can serve as an icon for another sign, which gives a further interpretant. In principle this allows for a hierarchical network of signs, with interpretation becoming more general as we move upwards. To be more specific, a Peircean sign is an indecomposable triad of icon, object and interpretant. The icon is the "bare feel", or presentation; the object is picked indexically, and the interpretant brings them together in a unified context. This triad can then form the presentation for a further triad that is more general, if not more abstract. There is no reason why several signs together cannot provide the presentation for a more general sign. It does seem, however, that this regress (or perhaps "recursion" would be a better term) must come to an end somewhere in some most general sign, with its interpretant being ultimate.
This raises the question of ultimate interpretants in biology. I will try to illustrate with a couple of simple examples how looking at biological signs in this hierarchical way can illuminate the opening quote. Suppose we have smell A (icon) of something dangerous (interpretant), then it is incumbent to avoid (object). For good biological reasons, this sort of interpretation has very short chains. Chains related to survival are typically longer. A slightly longer chain: Suppose we have smell B (icon) that indicates food (interpretant) that can be eaten (object). This itself is a sign (icon) that falls under survival (interpretant) indicating it should be accepted (object). Typically there will be longer chains both for the interpretant and often the icon. In particular there will be many molecular and cellular processes in the two cases described that I have suppressed in these examples. These processes will also have semiotic properties, and can be integrated into the respective chains.
Is survival just an accidental property of these cases, or is there something more general going on? I think the latter. Biological organisms are autonomous, and their functional components are functional just because they contribute to that autonomy (Collier 2008b) . The autonomy of organisms is exactly what constitutes their survival. Inasmuch as biosemiotic conditions are functional, and I think that they must be, then they will also contribute to survival (and reproduction). I suppose that there could be biosemiotic conditions that don't contribute to survival, but they are very likely to be weeded out by evolution, so they would be rare and temporary at best.
I think, then, that it is safe to say that biological interpretants are functional, that functionality ultimately is implies survival, and that survival is the ultimate interpretant for biological signs. Future orientation itself is just a necessary part of functionality. This justifies the opening quote.
